ANALYSIS

Latin America Continues Voting While Centralism Concentrates Power in Capitals

Adapted from Eugene Zapata-Gareschéa’s original Americas Quarterly article, this analysis examines how central governments across Latin America concentrate power, deprive cities and provinces of resources, and undermine democracy at the local level where citizens most directly engage with the state.

Where Democracy Truly Operates

Most political analyses in Latin America focus on national-level actors such as presidents, cabinet conflicts, election cycles, macroeconomic indicators, and the political dynamics of the capital. This focus is understandable given the prominence and visibility of national politics. However, it can obscure critical democratic challenges at the subnational level. As Eugene Zapata-Gareschéa argues in his original Americas Quarterly article, many of the region’s most significant democratic tests occur in municipalities, provinces, departments, and border cities where citizens request essential services such as water, education, shelter, transportation, safety, and functional institutions but frequently encounter a state that affirms these needs in principle yet fails to deliver in practice.

This mismatch constitutes the central issue. Across Latin America, decentralization has existed for decades as an aspiration, reform rhetoric, and constitutional framework. Since the 1970s, countries have revised legal frameworks, expanded local elections, and formally recognized local autonomy. Currently, governors are elected in 12 countries, compared to only 1 in 1980. Even states historically dominated by strong capitals and centralized governance have portrayed themselves as more receptive to territorial balance. On paper, these developments suggest democratic progress.

In practice, decentralization appears limited. The comparative study coordinated by Zapata-Gareschéa for the European Commission characterizes the region as caught between two forces. The first is centralism, a deeply ingrained political practice that concentrates authority, financial resources, and strategic decisions in national capitals, often supported by hierarchical and occasionally authoritarian governance styles. The second is an incomplete effort to empower subnational governments to address local realities, reduce territorial inequality, and restore democratic legitimacy from the grassroots. This unfinished process represents not a mere administrative issue but one of the region’s most persistent and subtle democratic failures.

Citizens reside locally, yet power remains centralized nationally. This dynamic explains much of Latin America’s frustration beyond ideological debates. Mayors are held accountable for service failures, governors for infrastructure deficiencies, and local offices for shortages in medicine or educational support, even though funding, regulations, and genuine decision-making authority often reside elsewhere. Citizens engage with democracy through the closest governmental entity, which frequently lacks the capacity to act effectively.

Centralism thus functions not only as a governance style but also as an emotional framework. It conditions communities to perceive their needs as perpetually awaiting acknowledgment from distant capitals that lack an understanding of peripheral realities.

A supporter of the Liberty and Refoundation Party (Libre) protests in Tegucigalpa, Honduras. EFE/ Gustavo Amador

The Capital Controls Financial Resources and Policy Direction

Public finance exemplifies this dynamic. Subnational governments in Latin America account for only eighteen percent of total public expenditure, with revenues averaging 5.6 percent of GDP—approximately one-third of the average in developed economies. Consequently, local governments are expected to provide public goods despite possessing limited fiscal capacity. Their financial viability relies heavily on national transfers, which are frequently conditional, discretionary, and susceptible to partisan bias.

This dynamic undermines not only efficiency but also the democratic process. Although citizens hold mayors and governors accountable, these officials frequently depend on national actors for funding. Consequently, distinguishing performance from political loyalty becomes difficult. Local governments may face sanctions not only for mismanagement but also for opposing national authorities. In such contexts, the system often rewards compliance as much as, or more than, competence.

The study presents compelling examples. In El Salvador, municipalities are frequently required to finance elementary school teachers, a responsibility typically managed by national education ministries in other countries. In Ciudad Juárez, local authorities face continuous migrant arrivals despite lacking legal mandates, budgets, and institutional capacity to manage migration. Migrants require shelter, water, sanitation, and urgent healthcare, often residing in public spaces. This reality demands municipal response despite inadequate legal and institutional support.

Centralism reveals its detrimental effects by transferring obligations without relinquishing authority. Local governments bear the visible responsibilities of the state, while national authorities retain control over financial resources and policy directives. This arrangement exacerbates territorial inequality. Wealthier cities such as São Paulo, Mexico City, and Buenos Aires can partially mitigate these effects due to stronger economic bases, whereas poorer, rural, and peripheral areas cannot. This dynamic perpetuates a cycle of uneven development, internal migration toward major metropolitan centers, and an expanding disparity between community needs and national government priorities.

The backlash in Ecuador against Daniel Noboa’s reforms to the territorial autonomy code exemplifies this pattern. The issue extends beyond abstract legal adjustments; it reflects the presidency’s effort to exert greater control over mayors by requiring them to allocate more of their budgets to the national investment agenda. In effect, local governments become extensions of presidential authority.

This analysis clarifies why federalism alone does not resolve territorial imbalances. The study’s comparison of twenty-two countries demonstrates that constitutional designations do not ensure equitable territorial balance. For example, Mexico, despite its federal structure, contains some of the region’s most transfer-dependent municipalities. Conversely, unitary states such as Uruguay and Colombia have been more effective than anticipated in aligning responsibilities with resources. The critical factor is not formal constitutional design but the coherent matching of power, duties, and financial resources, alongside the genuine willingness of central governments to decentralize authority—an outcome that remains infrequent.

The president of El Salvador, Nayib Bukele. EFE/ Jeffrey Arguedas

Authoritarian Drift Begins with the Contraction of Local Autonomy

The recent intensification of national politics exacerbates these risks. Zapata-Gareschéa identifies a diffuse authoritarianism emerging across the region, characterized by tolerance for strong leaders who promise rapid results while undermining institutions, checks and balances, and human rights. This governance style predominates at the national level, where concentrated authority is more easily justified, and local governments are often portrayed as inefficient, corrupt, or dispensable.

In certain countries, this authoritarian drift has become overtly aggressive. In Nicaragua, Daniel Ortega’s government intervened against opposition mayors and abolished municipalities via administrative decrees. In El Salvador, Nayib Bukele reduced the number of municipalities from 252 to 44 through extensive legislative and administrative reforms. Although these actions were justified as anti-corruption measures, they effectively marginalized local authorities as political actors and weakened democratic accountability at the community level, where it is most tangible.

This loss is significant because Latin America has historically been recognized for democratic innovation at the local level. For instance, Porto Alegre became a global model for participatory budgeting in the 1980s. Practices such as open town halls, participatory planning, and public consultation once provided the region with a democratic discourse grounded in everyday citizenship rather than solely national politics. However, as municipal autonomy diminishes and local budgets contract, these mechanisms become increasingly difficult to maintain, rendering participation more symbolic than substantive.

Administrative weaknesses exacerbate these challenges. Many municipalities lack stable, merit-based civil service systems, experience high staff turnover, rely on short-term contracts, and engage in politicized hiring. Institutional memory dissipates with each electoral cycle. Smaller municipalities face difficulties in basic budget management, and medium- to long-term planning is uncommon. Thus, even where formal autonomy exists, administrative capacity is frequently insufficient.

The argument for stronger local government is pragmatic rather than idealistic. Issues such as climate change, migration, insecurity, housing shortages, and digital transformation manifest initially at the local level. Martin Kaspar succinctly captured this reality in a recent article titled “The ministerial dinner is a costly foreign direct investment error: building a factory requires relationships with municipal clerks, not national politicians.” This underscores that development occurs in specific local contexts, requiring permits, infrastructure, local trust, and administrative competence.

This constitutes the democratic warning confronting Latin America. Decentralization is not a panacea; local corruption and weak administrative capacity persist, and territorial fragmentation may generate additional challenges. However, without meaningful local autonomy, effective administration, and genuine decision-making authority below the national capital, democracy will continue to appear imposed from above and hollow at the grassroots. Under such conditions, citizens do not cease requiring the state; rather, they cease believing it represents their interests.

Also Read: Colombia Charges Rebel Figures as Miguel Uribe Killing Still Haunts Politics

Related Articles

Back to top button
LatinAmerican Post