Colombia Misses Opportunities Remaining Stalled By Disarray

Philosopher and economist Jorge Iván González, once among President Gustavo Petro’s closest advisors, has voiced a stark warning about the country’s future. With disorganization, lack of capacity, and troublesome leadership at the helm, Colombia risks squandering its hopes for progress. For anyone observing Colombia’s political landscape, the notion that the country is rapidly losing the train of progress has become difficult to refute.

A Broken Governance Model

Recent comments by philosopher and economist Jorge Iván González, who served as a key collaborator to President Gustavo Petro at the beginning of his term, bring this reality into sharp focus. González—often referred to as “El sabio” in academic circles—asserts that the government’s inability to structure vital projects, coupled with Petro’s “difficult leadership,” has left Colombia drifting aimlessly. Far from the transformative promises that captured national attention, the administration now faces a cascade of unfulfilled goals and frustrated citizens.

In an interview with EFE, González spoke plainly. He criticized the chaotic method used to run the government noting that there is no leadership capable of uniting ministers plus institutions under a single clear plan. González himself directed the National Planning Department (DNP) between August 2022 and February 2024, spearheading the creation of the National Development Plan—meant to be a roadmap for modernizing Colombia. Nonetheless, he resigned when it became evident that core elements of that plan were being sidelined or ignored altogether.

Two factors underscore the severity of the problem. First, the administration seems paralyzed by its own lofty rhetoric. President Petro frequently speaks of monumental changes—he openly invites citizens to take to the streets, urging them to demand reform and a new social order. However, as González points out, those goals have not been translated into pragmatic steps. The very structures needed to transform discourse into policy remain underutilized. The government considers different proposals – from major but questioned health care updates to plans on protecting nature – without following a clear process to finish them.

Inexperienced activists placed in important roles limit the state’s ability to manage Colombia’s very complex bureaucracy. It is clear that handling public matters requires extensive practice, negotiation skill plus full knowledge of how institutions work. Yet Petro believes that steadfast loyalty to a political plan replaces real technical expertise. The result, in González’s telling, is “an enormous mess,” where even the best ideas from the National Development Plan gather dust in favor of ever-changing priorities.

Supporters of the Petro government may claim that small improvements suffer from urgent issues: active armed conflicts in places like Catatumbo, national security problems plus steady economic inequality. Although these matters require quick attention; using them as a reason for confusion restricts Colombia’s future planning. As González warns, the cost is immense: the country is missing golden opportunities to adopt modern solutions, like improved agricultural cadastres, organized strategic budgets, and updated social subsidy models.

Unrealized Promises And Lost Potential

One cannot overlook the fact that the Petro presidency began with a spirit of optimism. González recalls how many Colombians—including himself—anticipated a substantial, albeit incremental, shift under the new government. The initial direction appeared realistic, centering on three major structural changes: a “multipurpose cadastre” to revolutionize the agricultural sector, a “budget by program” strategy to guide strategic projects, and a “universal income registry” that would streamline subsidies. These measures, collectively framed in the National Development Plan, promised to lift Colombia out of its entrenched cycles of inequality.

Yet, as González notes, President Petro never seemed fully satisfied, not because the development plan itself was flawed, but because “divergences” kept emerging on other issues. Chief among them was the controversial health care reform. This reform much debated, became a focus for political tension while it blocked a full execution of the plan’s structural changes. For a leader who promised deep progress, the reality of scattered plans as well as partially applied methods proved surprising.

To make matters worse, the big ideas behind the plan—such as leveraging a modern agricultural infrastructure to diminish coca cultivation—remain stuck at the conceptual stage. In regions like Catatumbo, Petro’s public pledges of new universities and subsidies for farmers willing to abandon illicit crops fail to address the underlying complexity: without large-scale agrarian reform, robust agroindustrial projects, and robust local governance, the region’s age-old cycle of violence and poverty continues unbroken.

A sequence of large commitments does not lead to clear action. Discontent affects citizens as well as involved groups who expected Petro’s government to bring real change. González feels deep regret; he speaks for many who accepted the term “practical yet pressing” plan but saw it weaken because of slow institutions plus poor leadership.

Confronting The Challenges Ahead

Defending the position that Colombia is losing its shot at progress does not imply an outright dismissal of President Petro’s ideals. Even González acknowledges that no previous administration had centered themes like distribution, environmental protection, and social inclusion to such a degree. A gap exists between words and actions: between stating proper things and doing work to change conditions.

Petro does not hold full responsibility; Colombia’s government is complicated. Changes require help from knowledgeable advisors and key decision-makers. The president seems to pick eager backers over skilled officials who understand government work. This lack of ability fuels conflict inside his group, halts true progress, plus cuts out possible partners in the legislature or courts.

Petro’s speeches still resonate with certain voters, which underscores another point González raised during his EFE interview: the president skillfully portrays himself as the champion of change thwarted by institutional barriers. In times of widespread disillusionment, that argument can be compelling. Yet the country’s leadership vacuum remains a ticking clock. If no cohesive strategy emerges soon—if the National Development Plan’s foundational steps are continually ignored—Colombia risks solidifying its status as a country forever on the cusp of progress, never quite able to seize it.

Closing the gap between clear goals and real work needs a review of plans picking main changes plus hiring experts who know Colombia’s rules. In short President Petro must move from holding rallies to actual rule. He must form ties obey rules or start useful projects with strong effort.

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Arguing that “Colombia is losing progress” means you press for fast fixes instead of giving up. Although politics leaves the future unclear, Jorge Iván González points out that mere strong words will not move Colombia ahead. At a turning point, the country must restore order and trust, plus clear rules so that this hopeful government does not miss yet another chance. Only by navigating these institutional challenges can Colombia finally catch the train of progress—and ride it toward the modernity and equity its people deserve.