Brazil Sees Rio’s Gangs Redraw the Map Without Moving a Single Street
Rio de Janeiro’s state government kept two studies of criminal territory secret. Its first public accounting finds 5.1 million people living under drug factions or militias and traces gains by Comando Vermelho in neighborhoods that once answered to its rivals.
A Barricade Leaves a Paper Trail
When police haul a barricade off a street in Rio, a record of where it stood survives. Researchers at the state’s Public Security Institute used records from Operation Barricada Zero, the campaign to clear barriers erected by armed groups. Each entry marked a place where somebody could close a public road that a delivery driver depended on for work or a family needed to reach the hospital.
The institute released its study Wednesday after combining information from the state’s Civil and Military Police with field visits, drone surveys and the barricade records. Its researchers identified 1,530 areas across Rio de Janeiro state in 2025. Together they covered 614.3 square kilometers, about 237 square miles, and were home to roughly a third of the state’s population.
That works out to about 8,300 residents per square kilometer. A small gain in land can put an armed group within reach of thousands more people while barely changing the outline on a statewide map. Comando Vermelho appears in 779 areas, or 50.9 percent of those identified. Nearly three million people live in them, almost six of every ten residents in the territories studied.
The militias operate in about 300 areas with 917,105 residents. Terceiro Comando Puro, known as TCP, is present in 274 areas with 914,859 residents. Just 2,246 people separate the two totals. If the state assigned one public health team to each area, the average team working in a TCP neighborhood would have more people to care for.
The lowest population figure in the breakdown belongs to the 91 areas associated with Amigos dos Amigos. Their 221,703 residents could fill a sizable city.

Where Comando Vermelho Gained Ground
At least 84 of the 779 places where researchers found Comando Vermelho in 2025 had belonged in a rival’s column in 2019. Of those, 39 had been attributed to militias, 24 to TCP and 21 to Amigos dos Amigos. More than one in ten of Comando Vermelho’s current territories had changed affiliation in six years. A family could keep the same address and still wake up to somebody else’s rules.
Almost half of those switches involved militias, paramilitary groups that raise money through illegal businesses and extortion. That distinction matters at the shop counter. A grocer who gets a demand for cash has to find it in the week’s receipts. Swallow the loss, and there is less to take home. Raise the price of beans to cover it, and the neighbors help pay. For a household that has carried some of that cost, the immediate question is whether the demand survives the handover.
TCP, meanwhile, became predominant in 44 areas once linked to rivals. Militias moved into seven. Both gained ground in some neighborhoods while losing it elsewhere. For a government keen to show progress against paramilitary groups, those exchanges offer a flattering statistic. Every one of the 39 places militias lost to Comando Vermelho could come off a list of militia strongholds without a single street returning to public control.
The researchers caution against calculating a statewide growth rate from the older maps. Their methods improved, and they had access to new sources in 2025. An armed group might first appear in the newer survey because the researchers could document a presence that residents had known about for years. The 84 changes establish a minimum number of switches in identifiable places. Calculating Comando Vermelho’s net expansion would also require a comparable count of the places it lost.

What Counts as Taking a Neighborhood Back?
The state kept the institute’s 2016 and 2019 studies secret. A neighborhood association could describe what happened on its streets at a public hearing, while officials had the figures for the whole state. Residents can now take the government’s own numbers into that room. If two districts have comparable populations living under armed control, a council member can ask how much each is getting to keep its schools open and its streets passable.
Rio’s government says the map forms part of its plans for territorial recovery and for economic and social development. A shopkeeper deciding whether to report an extortion demand brings those aims together. Police may know which group operates on the street. The shopkeeper has to reckon with who will be outside when the patrol leaves. Someone has to take a complaint discreetly and follow up without leaving the merchant to face retaliation alone.
An official label can travel well beyond the territory it describes. On a job application, an address in one of those 779 areas could bring Comando Vermelho to an employer’s mind before the applicant gets an interview. To the person filling out the form, the same address may mean a paid-for house and a grandmother close enough to pick up the children after school.
What would a recovered street look like a month after police took the barricade away? A delivery driver could make the usual turn and unload at the shop. The grocer could order another sack of beans for Friday and know that the price on the invoice was the price.



