Colombian ELN’s Dangerous Cycle of Broken Promises
After the latest attack by the ELN that left two soldiers dead, Colombia’s fragile peace talks are once again on the brink of collapse. This isn’t the first time peace negotiations have faltered, and history shows that the ELN cannot be trusted to keep its word.
Why the ELN Cannot Be Trusted
Colombia’s ongoing negotiations with the National Liberation Army (ELN) are beginning to resemble a dangerous cycle: ceasefires followed by resumed violence, peace talks derailed by deadly attacks, and then a return to negotiations. This cycle has persisted for decades, and the ELN’s recent attack on a military base in Arauca that killed two soldiers is yet another example of the group’s duplicitous nature.
Founded in the early 1960s by students and union leaders inspired by the Cuban Revolution, the ELN has been a formidable force in Colombia’s long-running internal conflict. Over the years, the group has funded its operations through drug trafficking, kidnappings, and extorting civilians, all while presenting itself as a revolutionary organization fighting for the rights of people with low incomes. However, the ELN’s actions over the past several decades paint a different picture—one of violence, betrayal, and opportunism.
This is not Colombia’s first time at this juncture with the ELN. In the 1990s and 2000s, there were multiple attempts at negotiating peace with the group, only for those efforts to fall apart as the ELN continued its violent campaign against the government and civilians. Each time, the ELN exploited the ceasefires to regroup and strengthen its position, repeatedly showing that it was unwilling to commit to peace.
In 2016, Colombia achieved a historic peace deal with the FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia), the country’s largest rebel group. This deal raised hopes that similar agreements could be reached with other armed groups, including the ELN. However, the ELN has proven much more challenging to negotiate with, as evidenced by its continued violence, even as it engages in peace talks with the government.
How the ELN Continues to Exploit Peace Talks
The recent attack on the military base in Puerto Jordan is only the latest in a string of violent actions taken by the ELN since the expiration of a ceasefire with the Colombian government in August. In the weeks following the ceasefire’s end, the ELN has ramped up its attacks on military targets and oil pipelines, particularly in the troubled Arauca province.
The ELN’s strategy is clear: it uses the periods of ceasefire and peace talks to rebuild its strength while continuing to engage in illicit activities like drug trafficking and illegal mining. Once the ceasefires end, the group launches a new wave of violence, often targeting the government and military to undermine Colombia’s stability.
President Gustavo Petro came into office with high hopes of achieving peace with the ELN under his ambitious policy of total peace, which sought to negotiate with all of Colombia’s armed groups. However, Petro’s administration has struggled to make progress with the ELN, and the group’s recent escalation in violence has brought the talks to a near standstill. Petro himself acknowledged that the attack on the military base could spell the end of the peace process, saying, “This is an attack that practically closes a peace process, with blood.”
The ELN’s pattern of behavior suggests that it is not interested in a genuine peace agreement. Instead, it sees the peace talks as a way to buy time and negotiate from a position of strength, all while continuing to profit from illegal activities and terrorize Colombian civilians.
The Consequences of Allowing the ELN to Operate Freely
Colombia has already witnessed the devastating consequences of allowing rebel groups like the ELN to operate with relative impunity. While the FARC’s demobilization in 2016 marked a significant step toward peace, the ELN has taken advantage of the power vacuum left by the FARC’s departure, expanding its influence in rural areas, particularly in regions like Arauca and Norte de Santander.
The ELN’s presence in these regions has had disastrous consequences for local populations. The group has imposed taxation on civilians, often extorting money from farmers and small businesses. The ELN has even established de facto control in some areas, replacing the Colombian government as the primary authority.
The ELN’s involvement in the drug trade has also contributed to the ongoing violence. As one of Colombia’s largest remaining rebel groups, the ELN controls significant portions of the country’s drug production and trafficking routes. Its activities have fueled the international cocaine trade, further destabilizing the region and undermining Colombia’s efforts to combat organized crime.
Beyond Colombia’s borders, the ELN has forged strong ties with criminal organizations in Venezuela, where it maintains a presence in remote areas along the border. This cross-border activity has made it even more difficult for the Colombian government to combat the group, as it can retreat into Venezuela when under pressure from Colombian forces.
Allowing the ELN to continue operating freely would not only prolong the violence in Colombia but also have far-reaching implications for regional stability. The ELN’s control over key drug trafficking routes and its alliances with other criminal organizations make it a threat not just to Colombia but to the entire region.
Colombia Must Be Firm in Its Response
Colombia has been here before. The country’s history is littered with failed peace talks and broken ceasefires, particularly when it comes to dealing with groups like the ELN. While President Petro’s desire to achieve peace is commendable, it is clear that the ELN cannot be trusted to keep its word.
The attack on the military base in Puerto Jordan should be a wake-up call for the Colombian government. It is time to abandon the fantasy of negotiating a lasting peace with the ELN and instead focus on a strategy of containment and neutralization. Colombia’s military and police forces must be given the resources and support they need to combat the ELN effectively, both in Colombia and along the border with Venezuela.
The Colombian government can also draw lessons from its experience with the FARC. While the peace deal with the FARC was ultimately successful, it only came after years of sustained military pressure that weakened the group and forced it to the negotiating table in good faith. The ELN will likely require a similar approach—one that combines military action with diplomatic efforts to isolate the group and cut off its funding sources.
Colombia should also seek the international community’s support to combat the ELN. The United States has long been a critical partner in Colombia’s fight against drug trafficking and organized crime, and it can play a crucial role in helping to weaken the ELN’s financial networks. Additionally, Colombia should work with Venezuela and other neighboring countries to disrupt the ELN’s cross-border activities and prevent it from using foreign territories as a haven.
Also read: Colombian Spy Software Scandal: A Threat to Citizens’ Privacy
The latest attack by the ELN is a clear indication that the group has no interest in peace. Colombia cannot afford to continue engaging in a cycle of broken ceasefires and failed negotiations. Instead, the government must take a firm stance, using both military and diplomatic means to neutralize the ELN and restore security to the regions under its control. The time for peace talks is over—Colombia must now focus on bringing the ELN to justice and preventing further violence.
