Colombia's Catatumbo Crisis: Rebels, Displacement, and a Shattered Peace Attempt
In northern Colombia’s Catatumbo region, two rival rebel groups wage a brutal conflict that has forced more than 32,000 people from their homes. Recent government reprisals, suspended peace talks, and allegations of narco-motivated violence now imperil President Gustavo Petro’s “total peace” ambition.
The Dark Battle for Catatumbo
The Catatumbo region sits on the mountainous border between Colombia and Venezuela and remains familiar with violence and political schemes. This remote territory has attracted multiple armed factions due to its massive cocaine trade, and these groups compete intensely for control of the area. Its dense forests, poor infrastructure, and limited state presence create conditions ripe for clandestine activities—and brutal competition. Yet even by Catatumbo’s strict standards, the recent violence stands out for its intensity. Over the past week, at least 80 people have reportedly been killed, caught in the crossfire between the National Liberation Army (ELN) and dissident factions of the former Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC).
The crisis escalated so quickly that 32,000 civilians have fled their homes in search of safety. Many of these refugees—ranging from small farmers to entire families—have crowded into schools, sports arenas, or precarious shelters. Some have settled in Cúcuta’s General Santander stadium, hoping they can one day return to their farmlands without fear of stray bullets or targeted killings. Officials worry these hastily arranged sites will struggle to accommodate the sheer volume of displaced people, posing a severe humanitarian test to local and national authorities.
Although Catatumbo has experienced significant unrest for decades, this latest wave of violence is particularly disconcerting because it coincides with President Gustavo Petro’s high-profile attempt to broker peace with armed factions across Colombia. Petro’s “total peace” pledge involves negotiating ceasefires and eventual demobilization with any group willing to enter a peace process. Until recently, the ELN had been one of those groups. But the intensity of the Catatumbo clashes, combined with the ELN’s alleged targeting of demobilized rebels and civilians, pushed Petro to suspend talks with the rebel faction. This blow threatens the broader stability of his administration’s peace agenda.
Residents describe terror and uncertainty. According to a government ombudsman, ELN fighters have gone house to house, seeking out suspected sympathizers of their Farc dissident rivals. Home by home, the rebels allegedly interrogate or kill those they accuse of collaborating with other armed groups. While the ELN denies attacking civilians, eyewitness accounts and official government statements contradict that claim. The region is under a state of emergency, and Colombian security forces have begun deploying some 5,000 soldiers to try to restore calm. Whether that military intervention can truly protect residents or simply fuel further violence remains an open question.
Petro himself has conceded that the state “failed” to stop the spiraling violence in Catatumbo. He admits his government must learn from this failure, but precisely how remains unclear. In an interview earlier this week, he characterized the ELN as shifting from a revolutionary insurgency into something more akin to a “mafia” entrenched in narcotrafficking. He says the shift is ideological and economic, making negotiations more difficult.
Rival Rebels and the “Lost” Cocaine Shipment
Local media outlets, as well as the investigative news program Noticias Uno, have linked the Catatumbo bloodshed to a “lost” shipment of cocaine. This event underscores the narco-dynamics fueling the violence. According to a leaked military intelligence report, a multi-ton cocaine load vanished in November 2024, allegedly enraging both the ELN and a FARC dissident group known as Frente 33. These two factions, once rumored to have a non-aggression pact, now blame each other for the costly loss.
More concrete details remain sketchy, but Colombian journalists have pointed out that anti-narcotics agents in the Dominican Republic seized 9.5 tonnes of cocaine in December 2024. Investigators say the shipment originated in Catatumbo, though it is unclear if it is the same “lost” cargo mentioned in intelligence reports. Whether or not the seized drugs match the missing shipment, the timing dovetails with the outbreak of extreme violence. Cocaine remains Colombia’s top illegal export, and controlling supply routes through Catatumbo is a lucrative prize. Experts say that when a large load is misplaced, stolen, or intercepted, tensions spike among groups vying for territory and resources.
The continuing presence of both the ELN and FARC dissidents complicates the notion of Colombia’s peace. While the central Farc organization signed a historic peace agreement in 2016, more minor factions refused to disarm or break away from the demobilization process. These “dissidents” still carry the Farc name but operate independently, funding themselves through drug trafficking, illegal mining, and other shadow economies. The ELN, for its part, never joined the 2016 peace accord. Although Petro attempted to bring them to the table through official talks, the uptick in Catatumbo violence reveals how these dialogues have faltered.
Until this past week, government negotiators had hoped the ELN could be persuaded into a broader ceasefire. President Petro briefly suspended negotiations with the ELN once before, and now he’s done so again, citing proof that the rebel group orchestrated killings of civilians, ex-Farc fighters, and community leaders. The rebel leadership denies systematically targeting civilians, insisting they focus their offensive on Farc dissidents who are refusing to respect boundaries. However, the testimonies from survivors paint a darker picture, describing home invasions, intimidation, and forced recruitment.
Signs of the battered peace effort show up in the attorney general’s decision to reissue arrest warrants for 31 top ELN commanders. Under prior negotiations, those warrants were suspended to enable talks without fear of immediate detention. The attorney general’s office has declared the removal of privileges from ELN leaders plus now classifies them as wanted criminals. A sudden reclassification has upset the ELN members, who believe such actions show the government’s lack of sincere commitment to peace talks. At the same time, Colombian officials insist the ELN itself sabotaged the talks by committing atrocities in Catatumbo.
Humanitarian Crisis: 32,000 on the Move
The latest violence has led to a record-high number of displaced people. Ombudsman Iris Marin reports that 32,000 folks – kids plus adults – left their homes in just a few days. This mass departure surpasses past displacements in the region and marks a vast humanitarian crisis in Colombia. Local officials rushed to create emergency shelters. In Cúcuta, a large sports stadium holds thousands of refugees who sleep on thin mats with poor access to food, clean water, or medical care.
The temporary camps exist in poor conditions. Schools and sports centers that shelter these refugees fill up quickly, and numerous families must seek other safe places. Aid groups face two significant obstacles: they must collect enough supplies and protect their delivery trucks from armed groups. Various militias control most area roads, and travel on these routes puts people’s lives in danger.
The stories reveal deep pain and suffering. Elderly residents recall living through decades of conflict, yet express shock at the brutality unleashed in recent weeks. Parents speak of children terrified by gunfire at night, unable to sleep. Some fear returning to their villages, unsure if their homes are still intact or occupied by rebels. Others claim they left everything behind—crops, livestock, personal belongings—and do not know if there will be anything to go back to if the violence subsides.
The “domino effect” of mass displacement in surrounding areas is a more profound concern. As thousands flee, towns near Catatumbo strain to accommodate a sudden influx of newcomers. Schools reach maximum capacity, plus public services struggle, while local conflicts arise due to limited resources. Aid organizations caution that refugee numbers might rise from 32,000 to 50,000 within weeks, which would strain the area’s basic emergency systems.
The Colombian government has acknowledged the severe situation by declaring an emergency. This action lets them quickly access funds, deploy military forces, and set up crisis procedures. But many experts say the government’s response falls short. Even President Petro acknowledged that authorities are scrambling to catch up with escalated events beyond their control. Observers say effective solutions would require a military presence and robust social policies—investment in infrastructure, education, and job creation—to address the region’s deep-rooted inequalities. Whether the government can balance emergency relief with such long-term strategies remains an open question.
Petro’s “Total Peace” on the Brink
Gustavo Petro, Colombia’s first left-wing president, came to office promising what he calls “total peace.” He pledged to end the conflict that has ravaged Colombia for more than six decades and claimed an estimated 450,000 lives. Under his plan, the government would negotiate with the country’s myriad armed groups, offering frameworks for surrender and reintegration into society. The approach sparked a mix of hope and doubt: hope from people who want the bloodshed to stop plus doubt from those who remain skeptical that the ELN – a very active group in drug trafficking – would put down their weapons.
The troubles in Catatumbo highlight these issues. Security sources say that while negotiating with Petro’s administration, the ELN expanded its territory, consolidated its ranks, and built its military capacity. If that is true, the peace talks provided a convenient window for the rebels to strengthen themselves without facing the usual intensity of government enforcement. As soon as conflict erupted with Farc dissidents over a lost cocaine shipment, the ELN was ready to wage a campaign of violence—undercutting the premise that they were genuinely seeking a peaceful solution.
Now that Petro has suspended talks with the ELN for a second time, his peace plan appears to be hanging by a thread. According to government estimates, the more minor factions and gangs that remain open to negotiation account for only about 10% of Colombia’s total armed actors. In other words, the most powerful and profoundly entrenched guerrilla organizations—chief among them the ELN—might remain outside any formal peace process. Without the ELN on board, the government’s dream of “total peace” rings hollow, a partial approach that leaves swaths of the country mired in violence.
Ironically, these events echo Colombia’s long pattern: every time one armed group signs a truce, another faction splinters off, or a new warlord emerges to seize territory. The 2016 peace deal with the FARC was a monumental achievement, but the group’s partial demobilization opened spaces for smaller organizations and residual Farc dissidents to exploit. That dynamic is replaying in Catatumbo, though with higher stakes and more at stake regarding Petro’s political capital.
The president’s rhetoric has grown more pointed. He recently called the ELN a “mafia” plus pointed out its transformation from an ideological rebellion to a profit-focused criminal network that excels in the cocaine trade. The label means more than words – it suggests a change in the state’s approach to this group: from a potential political partner at the table to another criminal organization they must break apart. If this direction prevails, negotiations could be abandoned entirely in favor of a renewed military offensive. But such a “hard power” response has historically done little to reduce violence in the remote jungles and mountains of Colombia.
Civil society organizations continue to advocate for a negotiated solution, warning that a purely militaristic approach would escalate civilian suffering, feed cycles of retribution, and push the conflict deeper underground. They argue that sustainable peace must tackle root causes: rural poverty, lack of opportunity, coca cultivation incentives, and a governance void in regions like Catatumbo. Military deployments may provide a short-term buffer, but lasting solutions hinge on bridging the economic and social gaps that drive young people to join or collaborate with armed groups in the first place.
Meanwhile, the displaced population in Catatumbo cannot afford to wait. Every day that passes without a stable ceasefire or robust humanitarian assistance is another day when families huddle in inadequate shelters and children miss out on education. The threat of violence also hampers any attempt at relief distribution, as aid workers fear crossing territories controlled by different armed factions. The end of the peace process prevents local leaders from finding a stable solution.
The ELN’s next steps remain unclear – we don’t know if they’ll back down or continue their attacks. The group has always existed as separate factions that sometimes disregard top leaders’ commands. Some sections prefer talks, while others stand firm against discussions. Additional internal divisions could complicate future peace talks. But if the rebels realize that extra combat damages both their mission plus their finances, a return to negotiations might happen.
President Petro faces a key decision. He could try harder to save the peace talks, seek help from other countries, or set strict rules to restart talks with the ELN. Or he might give in to political demands for a tougher approach, next focusing on military control in troubled areas and stepping up anti-drug operations. Neither path guarantees success. The historical record in Colombia shows the government must be firm in curbing violence and flexible enough to negotiate meaningful compromises.
Uncertainty looms over Catatumbo’s residents regardless of the winning strategy. The area represents a small-scale model of Colombia’s wider conflict—a territory rich in resources but overshadowed by deep-rooted crime and constant unrest. The government’s promise to send 5,000 troops might bring stability so families could return home. But real change needs to fix fundamental problems. The people need access to education, medical care, and roads next to fundamental markets for their produce. Without such basics, any peace remains short-lived.
Also Read: Colombia’s Violence Escalation Undermines Peace Accords
The human cost keeps rising. Officials count the victims, but reports hint that actual deaths exceed the stated 80 casualties. A higher number of people might flee their homes while the threat of more violence remains real. The experts point out how this latest emergency shows Colombia’s thin line between war and peace. The government’s attempt to coax rebels into a settlement might have been the best chance to break that cycle. But after the recent meltdown in Catatumbo, the door to negotiations with the ELN may be closing fast, leaving the country to confront the possibility of another missed opportunity for lasting peace.
